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Abstruct
The economic dimension had not been the focal point of the CSCE/OSCE process before 
Ukraine Conflict. Russia exported natural gas and oil to European Union via Ukraine or Belarus, 
and European Union exported industrial and agricultural products to Russia.
After the Ukraine Conflict, however, the situation changed. The USA, EU imposed economic 
sanctions on Russia, and then Russia imposed counter-sanctions on the USA and EU. Although 
sometimes Russia used their natural resources as a material of diplomacy, this was mainly 
targeted to Ukraine. This time, however, Russia targeted mainly EU to change their diplomacy to 
Russia. 
Although Russia and some CIS states criticized the attitude of OSCE ,Russia and the CIS 
states have recognized the value of membership of the OSCE and the value of the presence of the 
OSCE itself. Under the Ukraine conflict, the OSCE has a important role as a mediator between 
the parties. Economic sanctions damaged both states so deeply that in this case the OSCE may 
have more power to mediate between parties which are embroiled in economic sanctions.
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between the CSCE/OSCE 
regime, economic dimension and energy security. The OSCE (Organization for Security and 
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Co-operation in Europe) is one of the largest regional organization in the world (“from Vancouver 
to Vladivostok”). This organization has 57 participating states, including all European states, the 
CIS states, the USA, Canada and Mongolia. This organization acts not only military security but 
also human rights, minority rights and other issues relating to European comprehensive security 
and economic issue1.
After the Ukrainian Revolution in 2013, Russian-Ukrainian people who lived in the 
autonomous territory of Crimea declared their independence. Immediately after the declaration, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin declared the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. The Russian 
government insisted the annexation was not forced by Russia but was the hope of the Crimean 
people. Not only the Kiev government but also the EU and the USA were offended by the Russian 
policy toward the Crimean Peninsula.
Russia supported the militia which occupied Eastern Ukraine and sent some weapons. The 
EU, the USA and Japan started economic sanctions against Russia just after the annexation of 
Crimea and Russian assistance to the militia. At first the economic sanction was so restrictive; for 
example, these states banned the entry of Russian officials and some businesspersons who were 
most closely concerned with the Russian government. Although the USA insisted on more severe 
economic sanction, the EU had a negative attitude toward making economic sanctions stricter 
because the energy supply of the EU mainly depends on Russian natural gas. After the Malaysia 
Airlines incident of July 2014, however, the EU agreed to the more severe sanctions.
1. OSCE and Economic Dimension
The origin of the OSCE was the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. In 1975 the Helsinki Final Act was signed by 35 states, including the United States, 
Canada and almost all European states except Albania.
The purpose of the Conference was, at first, a security dialogue between East and West.The 
Helsinki Final Act had three baskets and ten principles.
The three baskets consisted of:
Basket Ⅰ “Questions relating to security in Europe.” 
Basket Ⅱ “Co-operation in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the 
environment.” 
Basket Ⅲ “Co-operation in humanitarian and other fields.”
Although Western countries mainly insisted on the importance of Basket Ⅲ , Eastern countries 
mainly insisted on Basket Ⅰ and Ⅱ.After the oil shock of the 1970s, most Western states, for 
example, Japan, could change their economic system to use less energy. However, Eastern states 
by comparison could not change their owneconomic system as dynamically. To address their 
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economic condition, they wanted tocooperate with Western states, especially Basket II. So in 
1981 the Hamburg Scientific Forum was held in Hamburg, FRG. 
On 12 December 1981, martial law was forced in Poland by Polish leader Wojciech 
Jaruzelski. The US government insisted the martial law in Poland was introduced under pressure 
from the Soviet Union (Mastny:456-461). The US president changed from Jimmy Carter to 
Ronald Reagan, who was the hard-liner against the Eastern Bloc and who tried to impose 
economic sanctions on Poland and the Soviet Union. The US government hoped to be followed 
by other NATO states, especially Britain, France and the FRG. These NATO states, however, did 
not follow the USA because these states did not want to upset the Détente.
This economic sanction was the only sanction under the CSCE regime and lasted until 1989. 
In the Madrid Follow-up Meeting (Madrid FUM), the US ambassador criticized the martial law 
in Poland and the attitude of the Soviet Union. This was the only case of economic sanctions 
under the CSCE regime. Compared with the United Nations, the CSCE and later OSCE had no 
authority to impose sanctions2. So not every state obeyed the economic sanction. In addition to 
the Polish case, the USA also imposed economic sanctions following the invasion of Afghanistan 
by the Soviet Union. 
2. Economic Dimension and Economic Sanction in the CIS region
After the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, energy security became one of the focal 
points of international relations in the OSCE region. Russia had to export its natural energy 
resources such as oil and natural gas through third countries such as Belarus or Ukraine3. 
Ukraine was one of the main streams for the oil and natural gas pipelines. Under the USSR 
regime this route was not an important issue because Russia and Ukraine were part of one state. 
However after the independence of these states, the pipeline through Ukraine was a powerful 
diplomatic weapon for Ukraine in its relations with Russia. Ukraine has always had a fragile 
attitude about foreign policy toward Russia. Sometimes the price of natural gas has been a 
big issue between Russia and Ukraine, for Ukraine’s economy has been more vulnerable than 
Russia’s. 
The dependency rate for oil, natural gas and other minerals is 100% for Lithuania and 
Finland, up to 80% for other Eastern European states, and below 50% for Western European 
states. What is most important is that many natural resources are exported from Russia to 
European states via Ukraine or Belarus. So for Russia, the situation of Ukraine is the most 




 Fig.1 Natural gas and import from Russia 
 
Ⅲ. Ukrainian Conflict and International Political Perspectives 
Ⅲ.1.The Origin of the Ukrainian Dispute 
 The origin of the Ukraine conflict was not the events of 2013 on the Crimean Peninsula. The origin was in 
the independence of Ukraine from the USSR in 1991. Before that, no one had the imagined that USSR 
would collapse. So the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, ceded the 
Crimean Peninsula from the Russian Republic to the Ukrainian Republic, and no one criticized it. Over 
several years, Eastern Ukraine was under the control of the Russian Empire. And many Russian natives 
made a colony there. On the contrary, some of Western Ukraine (the Carpato region) was the area of the 
Habsburg Empire, and other parts of Western Ukraine were under the Russian Empire. However, the 
people who lived in Western Ukraine, including Kiev, were of Ukrainian origin. 
 After the independence of Ukraine in 1991, the dividing line between Russian-Ukrainian and Ukrainian 
origin was not only nationality but also regional features. In Eastern Ukraine was the heavy industrial 
area developed by the Soviet Union. However, the character of West was more agricultural. The placement 
of the factories was not considered the republics’ border under the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the linkage between factories was severed on the republic’s border. The national identity 
situation was similar to the economic situation. Many people of Russian origin lived in Eastern Ukraine, 
and in this area were placed heavy industries tied to the Russian Republic in the Soviet era. So before the 
Ukrainian Revolution in 2013, the seeds of recent issues had already been sewn. 
  
Ⅲ.2.Crimean Issue and International Politics 
 Before WWII, much of the population of Crimea were Crimean Tatars, who were Muslim. During WWII, 
the Crimean Peninsula was occupied by Nazi Germany. Some Tatars cooperated with Germany because of 
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3. Ukrainian Conflict and International Political Perspectives
3.1. The Origin of the Ukrainian Dispute
The origin of the Ukraine conflict was not the events of 2013 on the Crimean Peninsula. The 
origin was in the independence of Ukraine from the USSR in 1991. Before that, no one had the 
imagined that USSR would collapse. So the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita 
Khrushchev, ceded the Crimean Peninsula from the Russian Republic to the Ukrainian Republic, 
and no one criticized it. Over several years, Eastern Ukraine was under the control of the Russian 
Empire. And m ny Russian natives mad  a colony th re. On the contra y, some of Western 
Ukraine (the Carpato region) was the area of the Habsburg Empire, and other parts of Western 
Ukraine were under the Russian Empire. However, the people who lived in Western Ukraine, 
including Kiev, were of Ukrainian origin.
After the independence of Ukraine in 1991, the dividing line between Russian-Ukrainian and 
Ukrainian origin was not only nationality but also regional features. In Eastern Ukraine was the 
heavy industrial area developed by the Soviet Union. However, the character of West was more 
agricultural. The placement of the factories as ot considered the republics’ border under the 
Soviet Union. Af er he collap e of the Soviet U ion, the linkage between factories was severed on 
Czechrep
48
Energy Security, Economic Sanction and the OSCE
the republic’s border. The national identity situation was similar to the economic situation. Many 
people of Russian origin lived in Eastern Ukraine, and in this area were placed heavy industries 
tied to the Russian Republic in the Soviet era. So before the Ukrainian Revolution in 2013, the 
seeds of recent issues had already been sewn.
3.2. Crimean Issue and International Politics
Before WWII, much of the population of Crimea were Crimean Tatars, who were Muslim. 
During WWII, the Crimean Peninsula was occupied by Nazi Germany. Some Tatars cooperated 
with Germany because of the oppression of Stalin. However, after the withdrawal of Germany 
from the peninsula, the Crimean Tatars were expelled by Stalin because of their cooperation with 
Germany. Therefore, they were prohibited from returning to their homeland, and after that many 
Russians lived there.
Under the administration of Gorbachev, Crimean Tatars were cleared of the false accusation, 
and a few Crimean Tatars started to return. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Crimean 
Tatars returned from Central Asian states like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Although tension between the Crimean Parliament and the Ukrainian government increased 
in the 1990s, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,Max van der Stoel, mediated 
between them. Roundtables attended by the authorities of the Ukrainian government and the 
representatives of Crimean Autonomous Parliamentwere held several times during the 1990s. 
Finally, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was established in 1998. Although the agreement 
between the Ukrainian government and the Crimean Parliament was accepted by both sides, and 
the agreement was admired as the “Victory of Quiet Diplomacy of HCNM,” half of the population 
of the Crimean Autonomous Republic was Russian (58%).Max van der Stoel, the first HCNM 
himself, did not welcome the result because of the danger of secession.
After the Ukrainian Revolution in 2013, Russian-Ukrainian people who lived in the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea declared their independence. For the first time, Russian 
President Putin criticized the Ukrainian Revolution, but he also said he had no intention to annex 
Crimea. However on 18 March 2014, Russia declared the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. 
The Russian government insisted the annexation was not forced by Russia but was the hope of 
the Crimean people. The annexation reflected the right to self-determination written in the UN 
charter. Not only the Kiev government but also the EU and the USA were offended by Russian 
policy towards the Crimean Peninsula.
3.3. EU-Russian Economic Relations 
Many of the EU states import their energy from Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 
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Turkmenistan via Russia and Belarus or Ukraine. For example, Poland and Finland depend on 
Russia for almost 100% of their energy. Britain and Norway do not import fossil fuels from these 
states.
Of course, the EU introduced the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). Under the EU 
Treaty of Lisbon or the EU Treaty, member states of the EU should be expected to follow the 
decisions by the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the 
EU Foreign Affairs Council or the European Council.
For many EU states, especially Germany, Russia is the state from which they not only 
import fossil fuels but also to which they export many goods. All 27 EU states had a 27 billion 
euro deficit with Russia because of oil and natural gas imports4. And Russia is the third largest 
trading partner after the USA and China, which was shared about 10% of all trades. For oil and 
natural gas, Russia supplied 42% of EU27 natural gas imports and 32% of crude oil imports in 
20055. And for Russia, Russia earned 15% of its GDP selling natural gas to EU states. 
3.4. Economic Sanctions between Russia, the EU and the USA
After the annexation of Crimea Peninsula in 2014, US President Obama hesitated to sanction 
Russia. The sanctions process had three stages
Before the sanctions, US President Obama criticized the annexation and support for the 
militia in Eastern Ukraine given by the Russian army. However Russia criticized the Ukrainian 
government and supported to Crimean independence, and on 6 March the USA decided to 
sanction Russia. 
・06/03/14 EO 13660:  Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in 
Ukraine6
・17/03/14 EO 13661:  Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation 
in Ukraine
・20/03/14 EO 13662:  Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation 
in Ukraine
・19/12/14 EO 13685:  Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain 
Transactions With Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine
After the US imposed sanctions against Russia, the EU decided on their original sanctions 
against Russia. Not only the EU but also Japan hesitated to sanction Russia. For the EU, sanctions 
affected many economic matters because of their interdependence of economy and energy 
dependence. German Prime Minister Angela Merkel had an especially negative attitude toward 
economic sanctions because Germany imported about one-third of all its imported natural gas 
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from Russia. For Japan, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe strongly wanted to resolve the territorial 
dispute between Japan and Russia. However Obama persuaded Merkel, and finally the EU joined 
the international sanctions against Russia7. Other European  non-EU states such as Switzerland, 
Norway, Iceland, Albania, Montenegro and Canada and Australia followed the USA and EU 
sanctions.
Although the EU imposed sanctions on Russia, Germany persuaded Russia. On 18 
March,2014, Putin declared the annexation of Crimea to Russia; the US, the EU and Japan 
criticized it; and they reviewed the possibility of more severe sanctions. On 20 March, the USA 
imposed additional sanctions on Russia, targeting adherents and advisors to Putin. However, 
in this step, the sanction was restricted to banks and  construction companies, not Rosnefti or 
Gasprom. Although the presidents of these companies are adherents of Putin, these companies 
supported the Russian economy. So the USA avoided the sanction to these companies.
The second round of sanctions started on 28 April 2014 when the USA decided on the 
additional sanctions. Not only did these add persons to the list of those who could not enter the 
USA, they also embargoed high technologies which could be diverted for military purposes. 
The next day, the EU decided to enlarge their sanctions, which included an arms embargo, asset 
freeze and visa or travel ban. But the asset freeze and travel ban were not against all Russian 
people, only restricted persons (see Figure 2). So this sanction is typically one of the so-called 
“Smart Sanctions” compared to other sanctions, we could say.
The third round of sanctions started with the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 incident. The plane 
was shot down by Donbass militia supported by Russia. The USA extended its sanctions to the 
firms Rosnefti and Novatek and to two more banks. On 31 July 2014, the EU introduced another 
sanction which included trade restrictions relating to Russian energy and defense industries8.
Russia, on the other hand, decided on the counter sanctions on 6 August9. In the sanctions, 
agricultural products made in the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia and Norway were prohibited 
for one year. In the EU, 10% of exports to Russia are agricultural products, so it was damaging 
to EU member states. Eastern European states, including Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, were 
seriously damaged. For Poland, the total amount of agricultural products exported was eight 
hundred million euro. And the price of food in Poland decreased. The situation was the same in 
many Eastern European states. 
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 Russia, on the other hand, decided on the counter sanctions on 6 August9. In the sanctions, agricultural 
products made in the USA, the EU, Canada, Australia and Norway were prohibited for one year. In the 
EU, 10% of exports to Russia are agricultural products, so it was damaging to EU member states. Eastern 
European states, including Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, were seriously damaged. For Poland, the total 
amount of agricultural products exported was eight hundred million euro. And the price of food in Poland 
decreased. The situation was the same in many Eastern European states.  
 
 
  Fig.2 Agricultural products exported to Russia 
(Source:Nikkei Shimbun 23 August,2014) 
 
Ⅳ. Conclusion - Analyze the Economic Sanction about Ukrainian Conflict 
Ⅳ.1.Who Is Targeted by This Sanction? 
The sanction was, we could think, one of the typical so-called “Smart Sanctions.” However, this is not 
correct, for two reasons. One concerns the “state.” The economic damage not only affected Russia but also 
Ukraine. One of the main reasons may be the origins of Russia and Ukraine. These states were part of one 
state, the Soviet Union, until 1991. The Soviet Union, which was a highly centralized state, had a planned 
economy. So the investment from Moscow was the rational investment of economy in one integrated state. 
They might not have thought that someday the Soviet Union would collapse. Not only the Russian economy 
but also the Ukrainian economy had been badly damaged after 1991 because of their deep interdependence. 
So it is impossible for the EU or the USA to impose sanctions on Russia and restrict the effects of the 
sanctions to the Russian Federation alone. Sanctions against Russia not only affect Russia but also 
Ukraine10. Of course, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is illegal under recent international law; 
Russia pointed to the secession of the South Sudan, Kosovo and Montenegro for its legitimacy.  
 The other reason concerns “people.” This sanction was a targeted sanction. Not all Russian people were 
targeted, only a few businesspersons, military commanders and adherents of Putin. However this is not 
correct. Because of the sanction, the value of the ruble dropped dramatically in the currency market. In the 
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The sanction was, we could think, one of the typical so-called “Smart Sanctions.” However, 
this is not correct, for two reasons. One concerns the “state.” The economic damage not only 
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So it is impossible for the EU or the USA to impose sanctions on Russia and restrict the effects 
of the sanctions to the Russian Federation alone. Sanctions against Russia not only affect Russia 
but also Ukraine10. Of course, the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula is illegal under recent 
international law; Russia pointed to the secession of the South Sudan, Kosovo and Montenegro 
for its legitimacy. 
The other reason concerns “people.” This sanction was a targeted sanction. Not all Russian 
people were targeted, only a few businesspersons, military commanders and adherents of Putin. 
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However this is not correct. Because of the sanction, the value of the ruble dropped dramatically 
in the currency market. In the first Quarter of 2014, 1dollar was equal to 32 rubles. At the end 
of 2014, 1 dollar was equal to 50 rubles. This dramatic drop led to a recession in the Russian 
economy.
4.2.  Explain These Sanctions Using the Model Prisoner’s Dilemma and Some 
Features
I could point out two features about this sanction. A typical sanction is often a one-way 
sanction. For example, sanctions against North Korea and Congo and many others are one-way 
sanctions, not bidirectional sanctions. However, one of the distinctive feature of this situation 
is that it does not just involve a one-way sanction. Because of the economic interdependence 
between Russia and the EU states, Russia can recriminate through so-called countersanctions. 
Of course, the sanctions against Cuba by the USA are an exceptional case, but otherwise 
almost all sanctions are based on and authorized by the decision of the United Nations, and 
especially by the Security Council. However, because Russia is one of the P5, this time the United 
Nations was not the main actor and could not authorize this sanction against Russia. So in this 
case the reason why the sanctions escalated or why each side imposed sanctions on the other can 
be explained through the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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Fig. 3 Preferences of the US ,European Union and Russia 
 
For Russia, the preferences are X2-Y2>X2-Y1>X1-Y1>X1-Y2. For the USA and EU, the preferences are 
X2-Y2>X1-Y2>X1-Y1>X2-Y1. This table is not the typical Prisoner`s Dilemma, but both states would prefer 
X2-Y2 because of their economic interdependence. However, they did not choose X2-Y2; they chose 
X1-Y1.One of the main reasons concerns Russia’s internal situation. The approval rate of Putin was 
decreasing step-by-step before the dispute, to below 50％（Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2012）11. After the 
Crimean annexation, the rate was up to 85％（Interfax, 26 Feb. 2015）. Of course, the US and EU sanctions 
badly damaged the Russian economy, but Putin chose the way to keep his higher approval rate. So Putin 
could not compromise with Ukraine, the US and the EU, and so could not select the way to avoid the 
sanctions.  
Fig.3 Preferences of the US ,European Union and Russia
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For Russia, the preferences are X2-Y2>X2-Y1>X1-Y1>X1-Y2. For the USA and EU, the 
preferences are X2-Y2>X1-Y2>X1-Y1>X2-Y1. This table is not the typical Prisoner’s Dilemma, but 
both states would prefer X2-Y2 because of their economic interdependence. However, they did 
not choose X2-Y2; they chose X1-Y1.One of the main reasons concerns Russia’s internal situation. 
The approval rate of Putin was decreasing step-by-step before the dispute, to below 50%（Wall 
Street Journal, 24 May 2012）11. After the Crimean annexation, the rate was up to 85%（Interfax, 26 
Feb. 2015）. Of course, the US and EU sanctions badly damaged the Russian economy, but Putin 
chose the way to keep his higher approval rate. So Putin could not compromise with Ukraine, the 
US and the EU, and so could not select the way to avoid the sanctions. 
Another feature of this sanction was the double game. The EU decided to sanction Russia. 
But the EU has 29 member states. For a state such as Spain or Portugal, the effects of the 
sanctions were limited. Finland or Lithuania depend on Russia for almost 100% of their energy. 
However, they could import energy now, so it was not a serious problem. But states like the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria, which export fruits,crops or other agricultural products 
to Russia, were more damaged by the sanctions from Russia. Russia banned the import of 
the products of these states. Instead of importing them from these states, Russia imported 
agricultural products from other states such as Turkey, Egypt or Iran. So these Eastern European 
states risk losing access to the agricultural market of Russia. With these sanctions, the EU has to 
play the double game in and out of the EU. The EU is main player with these sanctions, but the 
EU itself includes three different types of state. So in this situation, it was more difficult for the 
EU to decide how to behave toward Russia.
Last year, 2015, was the fortieth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Many times Russia 
and some CIS states criticized the attitude of OSCE organizations that the OSCE tends to value 
human rights, democracy and rule of law 12. However, Russia and the CIS states have recognized 
the value of membership in the OSCE and the value of the presence of the OSCE itself. 
Under the conflict, the OSCE has a role of mediator between the parties. Economic 
sanctions damaged both states so deeply that in this case the OSCE may have more power to 
mediate between parties which are embroiled in economic sanctions.
Notes
1  In the Istanbul Summit Meeting held in 1999, the OSCE declared the idea of “Comprehensive Security”. 
See Istanbul Document 1999, http://www.osce.org/mc/39569?download=true(Accessed on 3 February 
2015)
2 The member states of the United Nations have to follow the decision of the Security Council.
3  Some researchers pointed out that the only resources or manufactures Russia could export to other states 
were natural resources and some weapons. 
4 Eurostat newsrelease, 83/2013- 3 June 2013
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5 Eurostat newsrelease, 145/2007 - 25 October 2007
6 http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/ukrainerussia/(viewed at 3/8/2014 )
7 COUNCIL DECISION 2014/145/CFSP 
The EU imposed travel bans and asset freezes on several officials from Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea 
referendum
8 ・Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP (OJ L 229, 31 Jul.2014）
・embargo on arms and related materiel 
・embargo on dual-use goods and technology, if intended for military use or for a military end-user 
・ban on imports of arms and related materiel 
・arms and related materiel related ban on provision of certain services 
・dual-use goods and technology related ban on provision of certain services 
・deep water, Arctic and shale oil related controls on export of certain equipment for the oil industry 
controls on provision of certain related services 
・prohibition of procurement from Russia of arms and related materiel 
・restrictions on issuance of and trade in certain ‘bonds, equity or similar financial instruments’ 
・prohibition to satisfy certain claims made by certain persons, entities and bodies 
9 Указы Президента РФ 560, август 6 ,2014.
10 The fourth biggest bank in Ukraine was bankrupt,Asahi Shimbun 4/4/2015 
11 Dr.Mikhail Dmitriev, researcher of Moscow-based Centre for Strategic Research pointed out that in the 
two or three years, the danger of anti-Putin might increase.
12 For example, OSCE has been criticized by CIS states about the election monitorinf led by ODIHR. 
Comparing to Russia or other CIS states, western states or EU member states is relatively little time about 
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